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LIFE ESTATES-Power to Consume-Remainderman-The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, applying common law rules of construction, has
decided that a life tenant in personalty with the power to consume is
accountable to the remainderman for the increased value of the bequeathed property.
Moltrup Estate, 424 Pa. 161, 225 A.2d 676 (1967)
Testator in 1940 bequeathed a life estate in personalty with power to
consume to his wife and upon her death the remainder to his son in fee.
At the death of the testator's wife the bequeathed property had increased
in value fourfold and a controversy developed between the heirs of the
life tenant and the heirs of the remainderman, both groups claiming that
the increment belonged to them. The heirs of the life tenant contended
that a debtor-creditor relation existed and that the life tenant was only
indebted to the remainderman for the value of the property as originally
bequeathed and hence they were entitled to the accretions; whereas the
heirs of the remainderman asserted that the manifest intent of the testator
dictated that the life tenant was merely a trustee for the property and
that they were the authorized recipients.
Ordinarily at common law in Pennsylvania a life tenant of personalty
without a power to consume was presumed to be a debtor of the remainderman for the original value of the bequeathed property.' When the
power to consume was attached to this relationship distinctions were
initially drawn and there were statements to the effect that the remainderman was not the creditor of the life tenant2 and the life tenant was merely
a "quasi trustee."' However, in 1941 the court in Powell's Estate4
unexplainably applied the debtor-creditor relation to life tenancies with
power to consume without bothering to distinguish prior inconsistent
decisions.' This debtor-creditor presumption was used to determine the
general intent of the testator absent any contrary expressions, even
though on closer scrutiny it appears paradoxical to contend that a testator
1. Reiffs Appeal, 124 Pa. 145, 16 Atl. 636 (1889) firmly imbedded this principle in
Pennsylvania common law. It should be noted that this doctrine is almost peculiar to
Pennsylvania, most other states having applied a trust concept either through common law
constructions or statutes. See also Letterle's Estate, 248 Pa. 95, 93 Ad. 935 (1915) and
Kirkpatrick's Estate, 284 Pa. 583, 131 Atl. 361 (1925) reiterating this common law principle.
2. In re Metz's Estate, 323 Pa. 241, 185 Atl. 740 (1936).
3. Watson's Estate, 241 Pa. 271, 88 Atl. 433 (1913).
4. 340 Pa. 404, 17 A.2d 391 (1941). In this case the court for the first time applied
the debtor-creditor theory to a life tenancy with the power to consume. It was shortly
followed by Hays Estate, 358 Pa. 38, 55 A.2d 763 (1947).
5. No attempt was made by the court to reconcile Metz's Estate or Watson's Estate
in the court's opinion.
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would intend to hold a life tenant as a debtor for the original value of the
bequest when he expressly gave him the power to consume.'
The instant court, apparently aware of this inconsistency as exemplified by the recent statutory rectification,' appears to have somewhat
stretched the existing rules of construction to arrive at a predetermined
result in conformity with the present legislative enactment. In ascertaining what the true intent of the testator was8 regarding distribution of the
enhanced value the majority rationalized the disuse of the established
rules and concluded that the life tenant was not a debtor to the remainderman and was accountable to him for the excess value of the bequeathed property. The court reasoned that since testator died in 1940,
a year prior to the date that Pennsylvania courts began applying the
presumption that a life tenant of personalty with power to consume was
a debtor to the remainderman, 9 such a construction was inapplicable to
the present facts. Additionally, it stated that the facts (1) that the
testator gave the remainder to his blood heirs, and (2) that there was no
provision in the will intimating that the life tenant should keep the
increment, indicated the manifest intent of the testator to distribute the
accretions to the remainderman. This intent would rebut any presumption of a debtor-creditor relationship if one existed, and dictate the
necessary order of distribution.
°
To support its analysis the court relied heavily on Lyman's Estate
in which the court concluded, in a very similar fact situation to the instant case, that it would not employ ex post facto rules of construction to
defeat the obvious intent of the testator not to hold the life tenant as
a debtor to the remainderman for the decreased value of the bequeathed
property. It arrived at this construction by portraying the solicitude
6. Note, A Debtor Who Can Consume His Own Debt, 99 U. oF PA. L. REV. 873, 878
(1951), points out that applying the debtor-creditor theory to life estates with a power to
consume vitiates the underlying basis for establishing such a rule for a life estate without
the power of consumption.
7. PA. STAT. ArN. tit. 20, § 301.13 (1948) abolished prospectively the debtor-creditor
theory and substituted a trust relation by operation of law: "A person having a present
interest in personal property, or in the proceeds of the conversion of real estate . . . and
which is subject to a future interest, shall be deemed to be a trustee of such property, and
not a debtor to the remainderman. . . ."It should be emphasized that the problem in the
instant case antedated the effective date of this statute and therefore it is not controlling.
Thus all wills with the problem of the instant case that are effective before 1947 must be
construed without the benefit of this statute.
8. It remains unquestionable that the testator's intent is the "polestar in interpreting
a will." See Hoover Estate 417 Pa. 263, 266, 207 A.2d 840, 842 (1965).
9. Watson's Estate, 241 Pa. 271, 88 At]. 433 (1913).
10. 366 Pa. 164, 76 A.2d 633 (1950). In this case testator bequeathed to his wife the
residue of his estate in personalty with power to consume and remainder to relatives and
a charity. During her life the securities decreased in value and the remainderman demanded
the loss be made up from the life tenant's estate.
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existing between the testator and life tenant and intimated that perhaps
had there been an increase in the value rather than a decrease the circumstances would have commanded a contrary result." Although the
conclusion in the case seemingly proximates the testator's intention 2
it is difficult to determine, as with the instant case, whether the court disregarded the presumption as established by the Powell case' 5 or just
found a contrary intent to rebut it.
In a convincing dissent Justice Jones vehemently rejects all allegations
of a countervailing intent rebutting the debtor-creditor presumption14
and dismisses the supporting Lyman' 5 case as an erroneous decision.
Upon closer examination the majority's other contention, that the rule of
construction was formulated after testator died and so is inapplicable,
appears to misconceive the reason for using rules of construction. A rule
of construction is assumed to represent what the testator generally intended and this presumption should be the same whether it is applied
before or after the rule is formulated unless it can be shown that a reason
.exists for a change from one year to the next. In Hood v. Pennsylvania
Society" it was stated that, as a general rule, when a judicial decision is
rendered the law is not presumed to be changed by it but to have been the
same before as after the decision. This should especially apply when a
rule of construction is considered because by its very nature a rule presupposes that most testators, absent contrary expression, intend such a
construction.
Although the instant court's conclusion can be commended, its rationale
could have been less questionable had it decided to renounce the common
law rule of construction of debtor-creditor presumption as erroneous
and supplanted it with a presumption similar to the one authorized by the
statute, which undoubtedly would more closely proximate testator's true
intention. However, it is probable that the courts will continue, as the
11. Id. at 171, 76 A.2d at 636:
It is a far different thing to find, if the intent of the testator be given due and
appropriate effect, that he intended the primary object of his bounty to have the
capital gains on the corpus of a life estate, which she has the power to consume,
than it is to conclude that he intended to impose upon such primary beneficiary
liability for depreciation in the value of the corpus ...
12. From the circumstances surrounding the writing of the will as described by the
court it appears as though testator did not intend to hold the life tenant responsible for the
decreased value of the corpus and yet at the same time if there was an increase it appeared
that testator wanted it to go to the life tenant.
13. Powell's Estate, 340 Pa. 404, 17 A.2d 391 (1941).
14. Moltrup Estate, 424 Pa. 161, 167, 225 A.2d 676, 684-85 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
Essentially Justice Jones explained that none of the facts as presented by the majority,
whether considered together or independently, refuted the common law presumption.
15. Lyman's Estate, 366 Pa. 164, 76 A.2d 633 (1950).
16. 221 Pa. 474, 479, 70 Ad. 845, 846 (1908).
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instant court did, to extend the common law tools of analysis to coincide
with the proposed end that the statute today prescribes 7 rather than
overtly refute entrenched judicial precedent.'
David J. Pleva
17. It should be noted that this statutory prescription is no panacea and in no way
reflects the true intention of a testator in all situations of a bequest to a life tenant with
the power to consume, but it does clearly provide a speedy means of administration and a
readily ascertainable conclusion of law. However it does appear to proximate testator's
intention more so than the presumption of a debtor-creditor relation in the usual case, and
this, hopefully, will outweigh any disadvantages resulting from the statute's inflexible
administration.
18. It should be noted that in a recent case, Sumney Estate, 425 Pa. 224, 228
A.2d 915 (1967), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania construed a 1938 bequest giving a life
estate without the power to consume to testator's widow, with remainder to his children
by a prior marriage, as creating a trustee relationship rather than a debtor-creditor relation.
The court stated that the testator manifested a contrary intent which rebutted the common
law debtor-creditor presumption. In addition the court found an ambiguous agreement
between the remaindermen and the life tenant obligating the widow to a trustee relationship. On the facts neither of these conclusions are clearly supportable and they seem to
indicate an approach designed to avoid the overruling of entrenched precedent.

